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Abstract—Game theory is often used to find equilibria where
no player can unilaterally increase its own payoff by changing
its strategy without changing the strategies of other players. In
this paper, we propose to use coalition formation to compute
the optimized tours of mobile sinks in charge of collecting data
from static wireless sensor nodes. Mobile sinks constitute a very
attractive solution for wireless sensor networks, WSNs, where
the application requirements in terms of node autonomy are
very strong unlike the requirement in terms of latency. Mobile
sinks allow wireless sensor nodes to save energy The associated
coalition formation problem has a stable solution given by the
final partition obtained. However, the order in which the players
play has a major impact on the final result. We determine the
best order to minimize the number of mobile sinks needed.
We evaluate the complexity of this coalitional game as well as
the impact of the number of collect points per surface unit on
the number of mobile sinks needed and on the maximum tour
duration of these mobile sinks. In addition, we show how to
extend the coalitional game to support different latencies for
different types of data. Finally, we formalize our problem as an
optimization problem and we perform a comparative evaluation.
I. CONTEXT AND MOTIVATIONS
In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) where sensor nodes
are static, we distinguish three architectures for data gathering.
In the first architecture, the sink is static. Collected data are
transmitted in multi-hop to the sink using a routing tree. The
drawback of this architecture is the heavy load of nodes close
to the sink, leading to a high energy consumption for these
nodes. In the second architecture, there is one or several mobile
sinks. Each sensor node directly transmits its data to the
mobile sink that visits it. The frequency of theses visits must
be tuned to meet the latency requirement of the application
considered. For such applications that do not have strong
latency requirements, intermittent connectivity is sufficient.
The problem becomes, how to plan the optimized path of these
mobile sinks in order to meet the latency constraint. The third
architecture is an hybrid of the previous ones. In this paper,
we focus on the second architecture.
The concept of mobile sink has been introduced to avoid
that nodes close to the static sink receiving a lot of traffic
quickly exhaust their battery. It leads to a more uniform
energy consumption among nodes. From the communication
point of view, each wireless sensor node is only in charge of
transmitting its own data to the mobile sink when it is visiting
it. Compared to a network with permanent connectivity, each
node spares the energy that it would use in forwarding data
received from its neighbors. Hence, a mobile sink by saving
energy of nodes maximizes network lifetime. This is crucial
for WSNs that are deployed in areas that are either hostile
(e.g. radioactivity, corrosive atmosphere) or whose access is
difficult, dangerous or expensive. It is then very important
to optimize the tour duration of the mobile sink in charge
of visiting the wireless sensor nodes. Furthermore, since the
worst latency delay is obtained when data are ready to be
transmitted on the wireless sensor node just when the mobile
sink left this node, data have to wait a tour duration before
being transmitted to the mobile sink. Subsequently, these data
have to wait another tour duration before being delivered to
the static sink in charge of processing the data collected.
Hence, the worst latency is equal to two tour durations. An
easy method to minimize the tour duration is to use several
mobile sinks instead of a single one. The problem becomes
how to compute the required number of mobile sinks, how
to distribute the sensor nodes to visit among the mobile sinks
in such a way that data delivery latency is met (i.e. data are
delivered to the static sink before their deadline). The basic
idea of this paper is to use game theory as a framework to state
our problem and find the optimized number of mobile sinks
needed as well as the optimized tour performed by each mobile
sink. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we briefly present studies related to mobile sinks
and describe some uses of game theory in wireless networks.
In section III, we model the data gathering by mobile sinks
as a coalitional game with n players, where each player is a
static wireless sensor node to be visited. Section IV reports
our simulation results as well as complexity results of the
approach proposed. We show in Section V how to extend
this approach to deal with heterogeneous latency requirements
or heterogeneous sampling rates for the data produced by
static sensor nodes. In Section VI we compare the coalition
game with an optimization heuristic. Finally, we conclude in
Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In the literature, several studies are proposed to ensure data
gathering using mobile sink. We distinguish three types of
approaches. In the first one, the sink moves to the location
inside the covered region that minimizes the energy consumed
by all sensor nodes during data gathering [1]. In the second
approach, the sink follows a free or random trajectory. Data
are stored in specific nodes to be later sent to or retrieved
by a mobile sink [2]. In the third approach, the mobile
sink trajectory is computed in advance. This trajectory is
optimized to take into account energy and latency constraints.
If only one sink is considered, this problem refers to the
Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) [3], [4]. If several sinks are
used, this problem shares some similarities with the Vehicle
Routing Problem (VRP) [5]. In VRP, the problem consists
in determining the fleet routes to deliver goods from a depot
to customers while minimizing the vehicles total travel cost.
In our study, we compute the optimized number of mobile
sinks and optimize their trajectories in terms of duration.
Unlike other cited studies, we do not assume that the WSN is
connected.
In a previous work, we used optimization techniques to
solve a similar problem. In this paper, we propose a solution
based on a coalition game and evaluate its performances with
regard to genetic algorithm. Game theory is a mathemati-
cal discipline that investigates the strategic scenarios where
rational agents are acting to maximize their payoffs. The
theory covers both cooperative [6] and non-cooperative [7]
settings depending on the agents willingness to cooperate. In
strategic interactions, the gain of a particular player does not
depend solely on its own decision. Indeed, the behavior of
other involved players will highly impact the outcome of the
game (i.e., individual payoffs). In [12] the mobility pattern
of mobile sinks in Wireless Sensor Network for efficient
gathering is proposed. Multiple sinks play a coordination game
with the common objective of covering the network while
minimizing the sinks moves. In a previous work [13], we
considered the deployment of wireless sensor nodes using
mobile and autonomous robots. We formulated this problem
as a non-cooperative game between two players that are
the mobile robots. Each user has different strategies, each
strategy corresponding to the ordered list of the sensor nodes
visited by the mobile robot considered. We found the Nash
equilibrium corresponding to the optimized tours performed
by each robot. However, this approach is not scalable. That
is why, here we adopt a totally different approach that does
not suffer from the scalability problem. When cooperation is
possible, rational players form coalitions to maximize their
gains. Later, the value of a coalition (achieved gain) can
either be divided among its members (i.e., transferable utility
cooperative games) or not (non-transferable utility cooperative
games). Hedonic games are a particular class of cooperative
games where decision of a player to join a given coalition
depends only on its members. Structural properties of the value
function such as super-additive are key parameters that govern
the coalition formation processes. In hedonic games with non
supper-additive value function the grand coalition will seldom
form and hence the partition of the players into coalitions is
studied and its stability investigated. In [8], authors investi-
gate incentive mechanisms for delay tolerant networks. Their
objective is to provide reward for relays that deliver content
to destination. Relays form coalitions to reduce their energy
consumption while increasing the encounter probability. The
authors propose a transferable utility coalitional game to model
the studied problem and study the coalitions stability in terms
of the Shapley value. The behavior of mobiles and their coop-
eration in the transmission of contents is investigated through
Imitative Boltzmann-Gibbs Learning Algorithm. In [11], a
delay tolerant network where mobile nodes collect packets
from data sources and deliver them to a sink is considered.
The nodes are rewarded through a wireless energy transfer
from the sink. The authors provide a two step formulation of
the problem. First the optimal packet delivery policy of each
mobile node is derived. Then, a repeated coalition formation
game, is proposed to investigate the cooperation strategies of
multiple mobile nodes. In [10], a coalition game model for
self-organizing unmanned aerial vehicles collecting data from
randomly located tasks in wireless networks was introduced.
A Hedonic game formulation was provided and the stability
of the coalition formation game proved.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Notations and definitions
Definition 1: A normal form cooperative game is a couple
(N , v) where:
• N is a set of players.
• v is a value function that assigns a real value to every
coalition C ∈ 2N .
A coalition formation game models groups of agents or
players acting together. It is defined by a set of n rational
players, denoted {i, i ∈ [1, n]} that form coalitions in order
to increase their payoff.
For any player i ∈ [1, n], let Ci denote the set of all the
coalitions containing i and let ui(C) be the payoff of player
i when belonging to coalition C.
Each player i builds its preference order, denoted >i over
its set of coalitions Ci. Let C1 and C2 denote two coalitions
in Ci, C2 is strictly preferred to C1 by i, denoted C2 >i C1,
if and only if ui(C2) > ui(C1).
According to [10], a coalition formation is said hedonic, if
and only if the two following conditions are met:
• The payoff of any player i belonging to coalition C
depends only on the players present in C.
• The coalitions form according to the preferences relation
of all players.
A round is defined as a complete tour of all players. In
other words, in a round, each player plays exactly once.
B. Hedonic coalition formation
Data gathering by mobile sinks is modeled as a hedonic
coalitional game with n rational players, where n is the
number of collect points to visit. The set of players is denoted
{i, i = 1 . . . n}, where i is a collect point to be visited by a
mobile sink.
The coalitional game ensures that at any time, any player
belongs to exactly one coalition. Each coalition represents the
set of collect points visited by a same mobile sink.
Each player plays in sequence. Let P denote the current
partition formed by the coalitions existing when any player
i is playing. Player i tries to strictly increase its payoff by
joining another coalition in P
⋃
{∅}.
In this hedonic coalition game, each player i applies the
switching rule to increase its payoff as follows:
Switching rule: Any player i leaves its current coalition C1
to join coalition C2 ∈ P
⋃
{∅} if and only if
C2
⋃
{i} >i C1,
or equivalently
ui(C2
⋃
{i}) > ui(C1).
Notice that each player is selfish: it leaves a coalition to
join another independently of the effects of this move on the
other players.
More precisely, the payoff ui(C) of any player i belonging
to coalition C is defined by Algorithm 1. We notice that the
payoff of player i is set to −∞ if either i selects a coalition
already in its history or if the tour duration violates the
constraint Lmax.
Algorithm 1 Payoff of player i ∈ C
if C ∈ history(i) then
ui(C) = −∞
else
if 2 ∗ tour duration > Lmax then
ui(C) = −∞
else
if size(C) = 1 then
ui(C) = −maxdistance− n− 1
else
ui(C) = −maxi∈Cdistance(i, centroid(C))− n/size(C)
end if
insert C in history(i)
end if
end if
where:
• Lmax is the maximum latency acceptable by the appli-
cation. The value of this parameter may also take into
account the residual energy of the robot. Knowing the
power of the mobile sink, the residual energy of the
mobile sink can easily be translated into a maximum tour
duration. To meet the latency constraint, the tour duration
of each mobile sink must be less than Lmax/2.
• centroid(C) denotes the centroid of the collect points
belonging to the coalition C. A player is discouraged
to belong to a coalition whose centroid is far from
itself. This player would increase the maximum dis-
tance of coalition members to the centroid, denoted
by maxi∈Cdistance(i, centroid(C)), leading to a poor
payoff.
• size(C) denotes the size of the coalition (i.e. the num-
ber of its members). n/size(C) denotes the number of
coalitions that would be obtained if all coalitions had the
size of coalition C.
• maxdistance denotes the maximum distance between
two collect points. As a consequence the value
−maxdistance− n− 1 is a value that is never reached
by a collect point belonging to a coalition whose size is
strictly higher than 1.
The payoff of any player is computed in order to favor
coalitions that collect a large amount of data while minimizing
the tour duration. Each player is strongly discouraged to join
again a coalition that it previously left. In addition, the payoff
of a player in a coalition increases with the size of data
collected until a limit given by the latency constraint.
Theorem 1: This hedonic coalitional game converges to-
wards a Nash stable and individually stable partition, whatever
the initial partition.
Proof 1: The history of this hedonic coalitional game is an
ordered sequence of partitions starting from the initial partition
P0: P0 → P1 . . .Pk → Pk+1 . . .. According to the definition
of a hedonic coalition game, there is a transition of partition Pk
to partition Pk+1 if and only if there is a player i that strictly
increases its payoff by moving from its current coalition in Pk
to a coalition in partition Pk+1. Since the size of Ci, the set of
all possible coalitions containing i, is finite, no player moves
back to a coalition already visited and the number of players
is finite, hence the history is finite. Hence, a final partition is
obtained.
We now prove that no player can get a strictly higher payoff
than this obtained in the final partition, even in joining another
coalition. By contradiction, let us assume there is a player i
that belongs to coalition C in the final partition such that i
would strictly increase its payoff by joining another coalition
C ′. In other words, ui(C ′
⋃
{i}) > ui(C). According to the
switching rule, player i would move to C ′. Hence, the partition
considered is not the final one: a contradiction.
C. Advantages of the coalition formation modeling
Modeling the data gathering problem as a coalitional game
allows a very simple expression of the constraints where:
• Each collect point is visited by exactly one mobile sink.
• Each mobile sink visits at least one collect point.
The coalition formation problem is solved in an elegant way.
The final partition obtained is such that:
• The number of coalitions in the final partition provides
the number of mobile sinks needed by data gathering.
• Each coalition belonging to the final partition represents
the set of collect points visited by a same robot.
There is no parameter to tune and no risk of obtaining a
bad solution because of an inadequate parameter tuning.
Notice however that the sequence of visits performed by
the mobile sink is an ordered permutation of the collect points
belonging to the coalition. The permutation chosen is the one
minimizing the tour duration of the mobile sink considered.
D. Discussion
We can notice that if the acceptable latency Lmax is higher
than twice the tour duration of a mobile sink visiting all
collect points, the game becomes super-additive and the grand
coalition is obtained as the final solution: it is the coalition
with the highest payoff.
The proof of Theorem 1 suggests that the final partition
obtained depends both on the initial partition and on the order
according to which the players play. This is corroborated by
our simulation results. We observe that the possibilities for a
player to join a coalition improving its payoff decrease with
the time because the other players having played before i have
already joined the interesting coalitions and the number of
members in a coalition is ruled by the latency constraint as
we will see in the next section.
Let us focus on how to implement the coalition formation
game in a network where the players (i.e. the collect points)
are disconnected. To perform data gathering according to our
solution, a number of mobile sinks should be provided. Before
starting the data gathering phase, we need to use one of these
mobile sinks as a mobile node (e.g. robot) in charge of visiting
each collect point successively. During its visit, the mobile
node brings the game to allow the collect point to play. The
game is then updated and the mobile node moves to the next
player (i.e. the next collect point). When the game ends, a
number of mobile nodes equal to the number of coalitions
formed become mobile sinks. Each mobile sink visits all the
collect points belonging to the coalition it is in charge of.
Each time the problem is changed, new coalitions must be
formed. The process of selecting a mobile node to bring the
game to each player is repeated and a new game is played.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the coali-
tional game in terms of the number of coalitions formed, the
tour duration as well as the complexity of the game expressed
as the number of rounds needed to reach the final stable
partition and the total number of switches.
A. Simulation parameters
Initially, each player is alone in its coalition. In other
words the initial partition in the coalitional game is given
by {{1}, {2}, . . . {n}}. In all simulation runs, each player i
computes its payoff when joining each coalition existing when
it is playing; instead of joining the first coalition that increases
its payoff, it only joins the coalition that gives the highest
payoff. This policy is called ”Best coalition” and it is used
instead of ”First coalition”.
Each simulation is defined by its parameters such as the
number and the positions of the collect points in the 2D area
considered, the value of Lmax, the speed of the mobile sinks.
The value of these parameters are given in Table I.
Notice that, for each configuration (i.e. a given number of
collect points), we performed 30 simulation runs conducted
TABLE I: Simulation parameters
Lmax 3000s
Lspeed 1m/s
Area 500
√
2mx500
√
2m
Number of collect points n ∈ {20, 40, 60, 80, 100}
Position of collect points randomly chosen in the area
Simulation result average of 30 simulations
using a desktop computer Intel Xeon E5 1620 processor with
8-Core 3.6GHz and 8 Gb of memory.
B. Impact of the ordered sequence of play
In this series of simulations, we evaluate the impact of
the order of play on both: the average number of coalitions
obtained (i.e. number of mobile sinks) and the maximum tour
duration. We consider three orders: random, rich-to-poor and
poor-to-rich.
With the random order, the play order is selected randomly
at the beginning of the game and is used during the whole
game. With the rich-to-poor order, at the beginning of each
round r the players are sorted according to the decreasing
payoff order and they play in round r according to this order.
Whereas with the poor-to-rich order, they are sorted according
to the reverse order.
Let us consider the simple example of 20 collect points and
play the game once with the poor-to-rich order, rich-to-poor
order and random order. Results are illustrated in Figures 1,
2 and 3, respectively. We can see that the order has an impact
on the number of coalitions. In this example, the poor-to-
rich order tends to decrease the number of coalitions obtained
compared to the random order.
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Fig. 1: Poor-to-rich order with 20 collect points.
Figure 4 depicts the average number of coalitions obtained
as a function of the number of collect points. As expected,
the number of coalitions increases with the number of collect
points in the three orders considered, because of latency
constraint. We also observe that with small configurations (e.g.
20 and 40 collect points) the order in which the players play
has no visible impact on the number of coalitions formed. For
each order (i.e. poor-to-rich, rich-to-poor and random), there
is a configuration where it provides the smallest number of
coalitions.
Figure 5 shows the maximum tour duration as a function
of the number of collect points. We observe that the results
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Fig. 2: Rich-to-poor order with 20 collect points.
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Fig. 3: Random order with 20 collect points.
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Fig. 4: The average number of coalitions as a function of the
number of collect points.
obtained are very similar for the three orders. This is due to
the latency constraint that limits the tour duration mainly for
large configurations.
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Fig. 5: The maximum tour duration as a function of the number
of collect points.
C. Complexity results
We define the complexity of this coalition game as the
number of rounds needed to obtain the final partition. This
number of rounds is defined as the number of times each player
played. It is also interesting to evaluate the total number of
switches that have been done by the players to reach the final
partition.
Figure 6 illustrates the average number of rounds as a
function of the number of collect points. Whatever the number
of collect points tested less than or equal to 100, the number
of rounds is less that 14. The poor-to-rich order provides the
best results in terms of number of rounds when the number
of collect points is less than 60.
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Fig. 6: The average number of rounds as a function of the
number of collect points.
Figure 7 depicts the average number of switches as a func-
tion of the number of collect points. The average number of
switches is ≤ 200 for configurations with a number of collect
points in the interval [20, 100]. The rich-to-poor order provides
the smallest number of switches. This can be explained by the
fact that the player which has the highest payoff plays first.
As a consequence, it can join the best coalition. The latency
constraint tends to prohibit the other players to join this best
coalition.
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Fig. 7: The average number of switches as a function of the
number of collect points.
How long does-it take to complete the game with the
formation of the final partition? Figure 8 shows the average
simulation time as a function of the number of collect points.
In all cases, we can conclude that the convergence of the
coalition game is very fast: it requires only a few number of
rounds (i.e. less than 14) and less than 18 minutes to obtain
the final partition. Since this result holds for a high number of
collect points, we conclude that the coalition game is scalable.
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Fig. 8: The average simulation time as a function of the
number of collect points.
In Section VI, we will compare the results obtained by the
coalitional game with an optimization heuristic based on the
genetic approach.
V. EXTENSION: HOW TO SUPPORT DIFFERENT LATENCY
REQUIREMENTS
We now assume that all data to gather may have various
latencies and each of them has to be delivered to the static
sink by a mobile sink before its deadline that is its latency.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider three latencies Lmax1 ,
Lmax2 and L
max
3 , with L
max
1 < L
max
2 < L
max
3 . We now see
how to model this problem as a coalition game.
A. An extended payoff function
The problem is modeled as a coalition game with n players
that are the collect points to visit. These players will group
in coalitions in order to maximize their payoffs. The payoff
function is updated in order to take into account the existence
of several latencies. In addition, a coalition must meet the
latency of the member having the strongest latency constraint.
In other words, any coalition C must meet latency:
• Lmax1 if C contains at least one member with latency
Lmax1,
• Lmax2 if C contains no member with latency L
max
1 but
at least one member with latency Lmax2 ,
• Lmax3 if C contains no member with latency L
max
1 or
Lmax2 .
Let us denote by L1 the set of collect points with latency
Lmax1 , L2 the set of collect points with latency L
max
2 and L3
the set of the remaining collect points.
The payoff ui(C) of any player i belonging to coalition C
is defined as:
B. Simulation results
We consider three latencies: Lmax1 = 1000s, L
max
2 =
1500s, Lmax3 = 3000s and we define for each L
max
i the group
of collect points Li with this latency:
• L1 = {1, 13, 10, 8, 11, 19, 15}
• L2 = {14, 9, 3, 6, 20, 18}
• L3 = {5, 17, 7, 2, 16, 4, 12}
Algorithm 2 Extended Payoff of player i ∈ C
if C ∈ history(i) then
ui(C) = −∞
else
if C
⋂
L1 6= ∅ and 2 ∗ tour duration > Lmax1 then
ui(C) = −∞
else
if C
⋂
L2 6= ∅ and 2 ∗ tour duration > Lmax2 then
ui(C) = −∞
else
if 2 ∗ tour duration > Lmax3 then
ui(C) = −∞
else
if size(C) > 1 then
ui(C) = −maxi∈Cdistance(i, centroid(C))−n/size(C)
else
ui(C) = −maxdistance− n− 1
end if
end if
end if
end if
end if
Figure 9a presents the simulation result obtained for 20
collect points and the three latencies Lmax1 , L
max
2 and L
max
3 .
To satisfy the latency constraints, 5 mobile sinks are needed
to collect data. Table II illustrates the tour duration and the
corresponding latency matching each coalition.
Notice that with only one latency equal to the highest
latency Lmax3 , 3 mobile sinks are sufficient to report the data of
these 20 collect points as depicted in Figure 9b. However, no
mobile sink meets the smallest latency Lmax1. Furthermore,
considering only the smallest latency Lmax1 would lead to a
number of mobile sinks much higher than required to meet
the three latency constraints Lmax1 , L
max
2 and L
max
3 .
As a conclusion, the latency constraint has a big impact
on the number of coalition formed and then on the number
of mobile sinks needed. A coalition game able to deal with
multiple latencies is much more representative of real situa-
tions. In addition, it finds the smallest number of mobile sinks
meeting the latency constraints expressed by the application
considered.
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Fig. 9: Poor-to-rich order.
TABLE II: Results corresponding to Figure 9a
Coalition [16 12 18 17
4]
[ 8 1 11
10 13 19]
[ 20 14] [3 9 6 15] [ 5 2 7]
Duration(s) 997,48 745,16 987,51 706,05 901,44
Latency Lmax2 L
max
1 L
max
2 L
max
1 L
max
3
VI. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION
In this section we want to compare the solution based on
game theory with a solution found by an heuristic. We first
define the problem as an optimization problem that we solve
with a centralized algorithm based on genetics.
A. Optimization Problem
Let G = (V,E) be the directed graph, where, V , (i.e.
vertices) is the set of collect points in the area considered
A, and E, (i.e. edges) is the possible movement followed by
any mobile sink in order to move from one collect point to
another.
Let C = (cij) be a cost matrix, denoting the cost for a
mobile sink when traveling from vertex i to vertex j. We
consider that cij = dij/ls, where dij is the euclidean distance
required for traveling from collect point i to collect point j,
i and j ∈ V and ls is the linear speed of each mobile sink.
Finally, we assume that all the mobile sinks are located at a
given place in A considered as the depot and all the mobile
sinks start and end their tour at that depot. Our optimization
problem is defined as follows:
min max
k∈K
∑
i∈A
∑
j∈A
dij
ls
xkij (1a)
max
(
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈A
∑
j∈A
dij
ls x
k
ij)
2
|K|
∑
k∈K(
∑
i∈A
∑
j∈A
dij
ls x
k
ij)
2
(1b)
s.t.
∑
i∈A
∑
k∈K
xkij = 1, ∀j ∈ A (1c)∑
i∈A
xkip −
∑
i∈A
xkpj = 0, ∀p ∈ A;∀k ∈ K (1d)∑
j∈A
xkoj = 1, ∀k ∈ K (1e)∑
j∈A
xkjo = 1, ∀k ∈ K (1f)
uki − ukj + nxkij ≤ n− 1,∀i 6= j ∈ A\{o};
∀k ∈ K (1g)
xkij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j ∈ A;∀k ∈ K (1h)
where xki,j is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the mobile
sink k moves directly from the collect point i to the collect
point j, and 0 otherwise. |K| denotes the cardinal of the set
K.
As indicated in the problem formalization, the first objective
(1a) is to minimize the tour duration for each mobile sink.
The second objective (1b) maximizes the fairness between the
mobile sinks in terms of tour duration. The first constraint (1c)
states that each link should be used by exactly one mobile
sink. The next constraint (1d) is for flow conservation. More
precisely, this constraint guarantees that when a mobile sink
visits collect point i, it must also depart from this collect point.
The constraint (1e) imposes the requirement that the number
of mobile sinks leaving the depot should not exceed the
maximum number of mobile sinks at the depot, and (1f) further
imposes the number of mobile sinks that leaves the depot
should be identical to the number of mobile sinks returning
to the depot. Finally, the constraint (1g) is used to prevent
subtours. This constraint is known as a subtour elimination
constraint (SECs). The literature is rich with several proposals
for SECs. In our formulation, we choose the one originally
proposed by Miller et al. [14] noted as MTZ-SECs. Basically,
uki denotes the number of collect points visited on the path
selected by mobile sink k from the depot to the collect point
i. This constraint imposes both capacity and connectivity
requirements. Indeed, for all k, when xki,j = 0, constraint (1g)
is relevant since uki ≤ n− 1 and if when xki,j = 1, it imposes
that ukj ≥ uki + 1.
Unfortunately, given the important number of variables in
our problem formulation it may not be practical to directly
solve our problem, and even for small size systems. One
possible approach is to use heuristic approaches such as
Genetic Algorithm.
B. Heuristic solution: Genetic approach
In our optimization problem, more than one objective func-
tion is involved. The task of finding one or more optimal
solutions is known as multi-objective optimization. To solve
this multi-objective optimization problem we decide to use
the NSGA-II [15] algorithm based on the genetic approach.
NSGA-II, for Non dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm, is
used to solve multi-objective optimization problems.
NSGA-II begins with an initial population P of candidate
solutions called individuals. Each population is called gener-
ation. At each generation, the fitness, which is the value of
the objective function of every individual in the population,
is evaluated in order to select the best individuals. At each
generation, applying the crossover and mutation operators on
individuals from the population generates new individuals.
Hence, an auxiliary population Q is formed. Both the current
P and the new population Q are merged together to form
one set of solutions R, which is sorted according to the
non-domination and crowded comparison. Finally, only the
best individuals in R are included in the next generation and
participate in the production step while the other individuals
are deleted. These steps are repeated until the maximum
number of iterations is reached.
To solve our problem using the genetic algorithm, we adopt
both the genetic representation of a solution (i.e. individual),
the operators (crossover and mutation) and the fitness function
(i.e. evaluating the satisfaction degree of the objectives) that
are detailed in [16].
C. Comparison between genetic and game theory
We consider three configurations of 10, 15 and 20 collect
points respectively. For each of them we compare the results
obtained with game theory and genetic algorithms. Simulation
results show that both approaches obtain very close results
in terms of maximum tour duration and fairness. However,
game theory outperforms the genetic approach in terms of
execution time: for 20 collect points it requires 327.69 times
less execution time than genetic algorithm.
TABLE III: Comparison between Game Theory based solution
and Genetic approach based solution
NB. Max tour duration Fairness Time(s)
collect Genetic Game Genetic Game Genetic Gamepoints theory theory theory
10 837.36 837.36 0.999 0.999 11.01 7
15 1214 1214 0.997 0.997 596.9 2.5
20 1154.78 1219.66 0.999 0.999 4260.8 13.0
40 - 1227.0 - 0.997 - 99.2
60 - 1470.0 - 0.997 - 331.0
80 - 1496.87 - 0.999 - 698.0
100 - 1497.06 - 0.995 - 846.47
Both the coalition game and the genetic approach are
centralized approaches. We now evaluate the ratio of the
coalition game solution over the genetic solution for three
different criteria: the maximum tour duration, the fairness
between the tour duration of the mobile sinks and the time
needed to get the solution. These ratios are given in Table IV.
For small configurations (i.e. up to 15 collect points), we
obtain the ideal ratio of 1 with regard to both the maximum
tour duration and fairness. When the number of collect points
increases, this ratio increases, but very moderately: it is only
1.05 for 20 collect points. However, if we consider the time
needed to obtain the final solution, the coalition game is very
advantageous.
TABLE IV: Comparative evaluation
NB. collect
points
Max tour dura-
tion ratio
Fairness ratio Time ratio
10 1 1 0.64
15 1 1 0.004
20 1.05 1 0.08
When the number of collect points is strictly higher than 20,
the genetic algorithm needs more than two days to provide the
results. This is due to a necessary increase in the population
size and in the number of rounds used to improve the pop-
ulation. That is why, we did not compare the solution based
on game theory with the solution based on genetics when the
number of collect points is high.
VII. CONCLUSION
In wireless sensor networks, sensor nodes have two major
tasks: the first one is the detection of events and the second one
is the report of the associated data to the sink. However, sensor
nodes may be disconnected from the sink, then the second
task cannot be satisfied. In such a case, one or multiple mobile
sinks should visit the static sensor nodes (considered as collect
points) to collect data. However, some constraints should met,
such as the latency of data delivery, the energy of the mobile
sinks (which are battery equipped), and the limited number of
these mobile sinks. In this paper, we proposed a game theory
based approach to determine the number of mobile sinks and
the set of collect points that should be visited by each mobile
sink, while meeting these constraints. Our game is a coalition
formation game that optimizes the maximum tour duration
and maximizes the fairness in term of tour duration of mobile
sinks. In this game, the players are the collect points and
each coalition formed corresponds to a tour of a mobile sink.
Simulation results show that the order in which the players
play has an impact on the number of coalitions formed and
on the maximum tour duration. In addition, the convergence
of the coalition game to a final partition is very fast in terms
of number of rounds and simulation times, even when the
number of collect points is great (e.g. 100 collect points). We
also performed a comparison evaluation with an optimization
heuristic based on genetic algorithms. In small configurations,
both centralized solutions provide similar results. When the
number of collect points increases the optimization solution
may provide better results than the game theory but at the cost
of a very long execution time. As a conclusion, our solution
based on a coalition formation game is a scalable solution that
needs short execution time to provide very good results.
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